INTRODUCTION
In 1987, U.S. News created its "Best Law Schools Rankings" and transformed the market for legal education. 1 Law schools almost immediately began competing to improve their position in the U.S. News rankings, which soon became the de facto measure of institutional success. 2 In fact, changes to standing in the U.S. News rankings can carry reward or punishment for law schools and their leaders. If a law school rises in the U.S. News rankings, the dean gets a raise; if it falls, the dean gets fired. 3 As demand for legal education steadily grew throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, law schools increasingly competed with each other by trying to influence the factors considered by the U.S. News rankings, especially their "peer assessment score" and "expenditures per student."
4 But the late 2000s saw a dramatic decline in law school applications and enrollment. 5 Today, even elite law schools receive far fewer applicants than in their [Vol. 69:2:495 heyday, and total law school enrollment is at a fifty-year low.
6 A low U.S. News ranking is no longer just embarrassing. It can indicate and even precipitate an institution's failure. This dramatic collapse in demand for legal education has prompted a renewed conversation about the purpose of ranking law schools, the accuracy of the information conveyed by the U.S. News rankings, and how prospective law students use rankings. Now, more than ever, law schools need a credible way to signal quality to prospective law students, and prospective law students need credible information about which law school to attend. 7 In theory, law school rankings can provide both. But only if they provide accurate information about quality and prospective law students care about the information they provide. This inevitably raises the question: What factors should a law school rankings system measure?
In theory, the purpose of ranking law schools is to provide useful information to prospective law students. Rankings can provide different kinds of information for different purposes. Existing law school rankings seek to provide information that will help prospective law students decide where to matriculate, but objective rankings can provide useful information only if they measure factors that are salient to prospective law students. 8 Different factors are salient to different students, and we do not necessarily know which factors are actually salient to prospective law students and why.
By contrast, this Article provides the first subjective ranking of law schools. It describes a method of ranking law schools based entirely on the revealed preferences of matriculating students. Law school admission : 1963-2012 (2012) , https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions _to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf; Natalie Kitroeff, The Best Law Schools Are Attracting Fewer Law Students, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2016, 11:18 AM) , https://bol.bna.com/the-best-law-schools-are-attracting-fewer-students/ (noting that among the very top law schools, only three law schools posted gains in applicants, while most saw their application pool shrink by an average of 20% between 2011 and 2015); Laira Martin, Law Schools Admitting More Minorities to Combat Enrollment Drop, NAT'L JURIST (Feb. 17., 2015, 1:22 PM) , http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/law-schools-admitting-more-minorities-combat-enrollment-drop (describing the decline in law student academic credentials including median GPA and LSAT scores).
7. See Taylor, supra note 6; see also depends almost entirely on an applicant's LSAT score and undergraduate GPA, and law schools compete to matriculate students with the highest possible combined scores. 9 Our method of ranking law schools assumes that the "best" law schools are the most successful at matriculating the most desirable students. Accordingly, this Article provides a "best law schools ranking" based exclusively on the LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs of matriculating students.
Objective rankings of law schools try to tell prospective law students which law school they should attend. This Article provides a subjective ranking of law schools by asking which law schools prospective law students actually choose to attend. This "revealed-preferences" method of ranking law schools may help identify which factors are actually salient to prospective law students. While it is roughly consistent with the U.S. News rankings as well as other rankings systems at the top and bottom, it diverges in many cases, occasionally quite significantly. This suggests that some law schools are better at gaming rankings systems than appealing to students and vice versa. In other words, objective ranking systems do not measure all of the factors that are salient to prospective students.
I. LAW SCHOOL RANKINGS
Ideally, law school rankings provide salient information to prospective law students, employers, and law schools. Prospective law students rely on law school rankings to evaluate the marginal costs and benefits associated with an investment in legal education at a particular institution. 10 Employers rely on law school rankings in directing their investments in human capital. 11 Law schools use law school rankings as an external gauge of institutional success. 12 If law school rankings provide inaccurate information about law school quality, they could decrease the ability of prospective law students, prospective employers, and law schools to make efficient choices. However, different consumers use law school rankings in different ways. Prospective law students, employers, and law schools assign different weights to different factors. The usefulness of a law school ranking system depends not only on which factors it considers, but also on its intended audience. The intended audience of a rankings system is typically prospective law students.
13 So, the usefulness of a rankings system depends primarily on whether it provides information about factors that are salient to prospective law students.
A. The U.S. News Rankings
The U.S. News rankings are based on a composite score of several factors, which the magazine periodically reweights in an effort to improve its rankings.
14 Among other things, the U.S. News rankings consider: (1) "quality assessment," a proxy for reputational quality based on surveys distributed to certain law professors and legal professionals; (2) "selectivity," or the entrance credentials of matriculants, including median undergraduate GPA and median LSAT scores, as well as acceptance rates; (3) "placement success," or post-graduation outcomes, such as bar passage and employment rates; and (4) "faculty resources," or student-faculty ratio, per student expenditures, and library size. 15 In practice, the single most important factor in the U.S. News methodology is the quality assessment, or peer-review category, which is the subject of two chief criticisms. 16 First, ratings in this category are highly time-invariant; year-to-year quality assessment ratings are correlated better than 95% with the last five years' ratings.
17 Because these ratings are not responsive to actual changes in quality at a given law school from year to year, this is an indication that the U.S. News' quality assessment may not be a (Sept. 12, 2017, 8:34 PM) , http://witnesseth.typepad.com/blog/2017/09/predicting-the-future-of-us-news-withrevealed-preference-rankings.html. it purports to measure. Second, the category accounts for 40% of a law school's total score, 18 and yet this rating is determined subjectively by academics and lawyers 19 who, in determining their ratings, may not give as much consideration to the factors that are salient to students. Whatever the reason, critics agree that the U.S. News methodology's heavy reliance on quality assessment causes stagnation, because quality assessment is remarkably "sticky," causing rankings to "echo" in the following year. 20 
B. Alternative Rankings
Many scholars have criticized the U.S. News law school rankings and proposed alternative rankings systems. 21 For example, Black and Caron suggested an alternative to the U.S. News ranking using a measurement of a law faculty's Social Science Research Network (SSRN) scholarship output to substitute for the law school's peer assessment score, drawing on the literature linking research productivity and perceptions of educational quality. 22 While intriguing, their model is more accurately a measure of research quality than of institutional quality. 23 Other studies have examined the reputational peer review scores assigned to law schools and have found indications of ranking stagnation amidst a changing set of categorical weights employed in the U.S. News methodology. Principally, these studies offer descriptive insight into peer assessment evaluations in legal education 24 and the legal job market facing new law graduates. 25 When combined with earlier scholarship on ranking systems, these studies help show what rankings do well and also where rankings can fail. However, no study to date has adequately addressed the alarming decrease in law school applications, which has forced law schools to admit students with lower GPAs and LSATs in order to fill their classes. 26 As the market for legal education changes, existing law school rankings may become increasingly meaningless, as the factors they measure diverge from the factors that matter to prospective law students.
Other rankings systems are based on outcomes. For example, Above the Law has created a popular law school rankings system based primarily on tuition cost and employment. 27 It is reasonable to assume that predicted economic outcomes are salient to prospective students.
II. A CONSUMER'S PREFERENCE APPROACH
The shift in the market for legal education from a surplus to a shortage of prospective students suggests a need for a new approach to ranking law schools. Legal education is a buyer's market. Prospective law students have more and better choices, as well as access to more and better information about law schools, both from the schools themselves and from third-party sources. Law schools at every quality level compete to attract the prospective students with the highest stats. Oddly, few empirical studies have examined the revealed preferences of matriculating students.
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The participants in the market for legal education need law school rankings systems to provide a different kind of information and answer a different question than they have in the past: which law schools attract the most competitive students and why? Because law school admissions decisions are based almost exclusively on an applicant's undergraduate GPA and LSAT score, 29 students with similar score profiles will have similar choices of potential law schools. In effect, the score is a prospective student's "currency," because it determines which products that student can purchase. By identifying which law schools matriculated the students with the highest scores, we can identify the "best" law schools from the perspective of the consumers of legal education. The law school that matriculates the students with the highest scores is ipso facto the "best," and the law school that matriculates the students with the lowest scores is ipso facto the "worst," with a range in between. This consumer preference method of ranking law schools measures the subjective preferences of prospective students, rather than predetermined objective factors like other rankings systems. The problem with measuring objective factors is that those factors may not be salient to actual prospective law students. Prospective law students want information about factors that are salient to their preferences, and law schools want information about how to attract students. Law school rankings systems that measure objective factors may provide unhelpful information to prospective students by failing to measure salient factors, and may create an incentive for law schools to compete on factors that are not salient to students. By contrast, a revealed-preferences method of ranking law schools asks only what prospective students actually want, rather than what they should want.
III. THE DATA
To rank law schools based on the underlying "purchasing-power" of their students, this Article employs the American Bar Association (ABA) Rule 509 Required Disclosures, a loose, panel dataset comprising an array of institutional characteristics of law schools, including many of the same characteristics contemplated by the U.S. News' methodology. 30 The data are reported annually by the institutions themselves and though not conducive to casual perusal, the dataset is intended to provide consumer and public transparency. 31 The data used in this study was collected from 2011 through 2016 by each accredited law school in the country as reported to the ABA, the accrediting body for all American law schools. 32 The authors accessed this portal and merged available ABA Rule 509 Disclosure data by accredited institution, by year, as well as available aggregate data. Finally, the U.S. News and Above the Law rankings were hand-coded and mapped onto the existing dataset.
When compiled from the multiple component datasets, the full data set surveys all 204 nationally-accredited and provisionally-accredited law schools (coded as observations by year in the complete data set) and records their institutional responses to over 500 variables relating to key metrics of equal access, student characteristics and outcomes, curriculum, faculty demographics, institutional resources, as well as their U.S. News rankings and peer assessments and the Above the Law rankings. This study employs a much smaller subset of variables from the full data set that are linked to quality and value against the same number of observations. Because this Article focuses solely on the reported quartile measures of GPA and LSAT as a measure of a law school's matriculant buying power, in total, this data set comprises six variables linked to matriculating students' GPAs and LSATs per year per institution from 2011 through 2016. We acknowledge the limitations of these data, however, in not fully contemplating the transfer market for rising second-year law (2L) students. Given that law schools are not required to report this information, 33 these data are unavailable, and our results should be read as an indicator of the consumer preferences of law students at the time of initial matriculation. We now offer a revealed-preferences approach to ranking law schools on the basis of the GPA and LSAT credentials of the entering law students they matriculate.
IV. THE REVEALED-PREFERENCES RANKINGS
Law schools in our ranking were assigned a scaled desirability index score based on the "purchasing power" of their matriculating students. This index score was summed from six equal parts: a scaled 75th percentile GPA, a scaled median GPA, a scaled 25th percentile GPA, a scaled 75th percentile LSAT, a scaled median LSAT, and a scaled 25th percentile LSAT-each given one-sixth weight to construct the index. The consumer preference rankings we constructed from these index scores, proffered in the appendix below, surprised us because there are consistencies between this ranking system and previous years' peer review ratings, particularly among the top law schools. However, there are several notable exceptions, a few of which are detailed below, and the full rankings are published in the appendix at Table 1 .
First, our rankings shake up the perennial contenders outside of the top-10. For example, the "T-14s" (top-14) are disrupted, with Texas falling on the outside of the coveted territory, while Georgetown narrowly scraped back into the top-14. Several public universities in the South tend to perform better in this ranking than their U.S. News ranking, such as Alabama, William & Mary, and Georgia, all of which make our top-25. U.S. News rankings to 42 in our rankings, and other traditionally top-30 schools such as Arizona State, Ohio State, and Wisconsin, and newcomer UC-Irvine, were on the outside looking in.
There were some surprising additions to the top-25, such as BYU, and top-35, such as SMU and George Mason, all of which are usually rated in the middle of the top-100 law schools by U.S. News. Also, perennial top-40 schools were also impacted, like North Carolina, which fell to 45, and Washington & Lee fell precipitously to 65. Florida State, Utah, and Maryland were also ousted from the top-50. Notable newcomers to the top-50 include Nebraska, Northeastern, and Pepperdine.
There was considerable within-tier movement among the next tier of schools and a few fresh faces. San Diego, Villanova, and Penn State each cracked the top-75, while Seton Hall, Tulane, and Kentucky dropped to the back of or outside the top-75. However, Connecticut and Rutgers nearly fell out of the top-100 in our rankings, despite being rated by U.S. News in the top-65. Meanwhile, Florida International, Wayne State, and New Hampshire, which were each ranked at 100 by U.S. News, and Belmont, which is not ranked by U.S. News, all made their way well into the top-100. While Texas A&M and Quinnipiac made significant strides to check in at 82 and 96, respectively, American slid precipitously back to 87. Notable schools that fell outside the top-100 include Chicago-Kent, Brooklyn, Loyola Chicago, Syracuse, Stetson, Hawaii, West Virginia, Marquette, and Louisville. Several schools rated by U.S. News in the top-150 fell below that rating in our rankings, such as: Howard, Baltimore, Willamette, Loyola New Orleans, Vermont, Widener Commonwealth, and Northern Illinois.
Overall, this revealed-preferences ranking system departs from the U.S. News and Above the Law rankings system at statistically significant levels. Accordingly, it may be a preferable approach to measure law school quality from the perspective of prospective students. It suggests that objective rankings may not measure all of the factors that are salient to prospective law students, including the law school's religious or ideological affiliation. For example, several law schools with a strong religious identity like Brigham Young, Pepperdine, and Liberty significantly outperform their U.S. News and Above the Law rankings, suggesting that this is a highly salient factor to some students. George Mason's ideological identity may be a very salient factor for other students. Other discrepancies may also reflect the failure of objective rankings to incorporate or accurately measure salient factors for students.
While law is an increasingly global profession, many prospective law students decide which school to attend based on the geographic location of the school, and many law schools compete for law students at the regional level. For instance, law schools like SMU and Texas A&M benefit from being the only accredited law schools in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex, a factor that may be salient to students wishing to study law in the country's fourth-largest metropolitan area, while other major metropolitan areas-New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago-are saturated with law schools that engage in more vigorous competition for the students who want to study law in those geographical areas. Accordingly, we adapt our revealed preferences to the four U.S. Census Bureau regions-Northeast, Midwest, South, and West-in order to demonstrate the regional ordering of law schools according to a revealed-preferences approach. These results are offered in the appendix at Tables 2-5 .
CONCLUSION
Reliable indicators of quality are essential to inform market participants' expectations but should be responsive enough to changes in quality and value that they do not become synonymous with participants' expectations. 34 Nearly every ranking system must make tradeoffs between simplicity and accuracy of measurement. We believe this ranking system combines both: its construction from essentially two student-level characteristics is remarkably simple, yet it accurately operationalizes and measures a consumer preference. As our rankings indicate, while there are similarities between the U.S. News peer review ratings and the rankings we offer, there are many notable discrepancies. The U.S. News' methodology relies heavily on peer review ratings, while our rankings rely instead on a measure of law student choice, a difference which some in the academy have suggested corresponds with lagging and leading indicators of quality, respectively. 35 The rankings we proffer below form the basis of a consumer preference model and thus present a fundamentally improved ranking alternative for prospective students, not to mention the public, who wish to see where the best students are choosing to attend law school. * * * 34. See Rapoport, supra note 21, at 1098; Redding, supra note 11, at 594; Solomon, supra note 28.
35. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 17. 
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